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(1849) 
ARTICLE 
DIMENSIONS OF DELEGATION 
CARY COGLIANESE† 
The nondelegation doctrine has mattered more in U.S. constitutional 
history for what courts have not done with it than for what they have. This 
doctrine, which ostensibly constrains Congress in its ability to authorize 
executive officers to make rules, has been fundamental to the development of 
the modern administrative state mainly because the Supreme Court has 
almost never invoked it to invalidate congressional legislation authorizing 
rulemaking by executive officers. With the exception of the Court’s 
disapproval of the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1935,1 the Court has 
rejected all other challenges to legislation based on the nondelegation 
doctrine,2 leading many judges and scholars to surmise that the doctrine is 
“dead,” “moribund,” or a “failure.”3  
 
† Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, and Director of the Penn Program 
on Regulation, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges research 
assistance from Lavi M. Ben Dor, Joseph M. DeQuarto, Taylor Hertzler, Jared Kadich, and Gabriel Scheffler, 
as well as helpful comments on earlier versions of this Article from Lavi M. Ben Dor, Reeve Bull, Ronald A. 
Cass, John Cooney, Kristen DeWilde, Michael Herz, Sophia Lee, Ronald Levin, Alan Morrison, Edward 
Rubin, Gabriel Scheffler, and participants at the several events where I discussed this work at the University 
of Pennsylvania Law School and the C. Boyden Gray Center for the Study of the Administrative State at 
George Mason University.  
1 See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Pan. Refining Co. v. Ryan, 
293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
2 In one other case, the Court has held unconstitutional the delegation of authority to private 
parties. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). But the Court’s underlying reasoning in 
that case sounded decidedly in due process considerations more than the nondelegation doctrine. 
See id. at 311 (“[A] statute which attempts to confer such power undertakes an intolerable and 
unconstitutional interference with personal liberty and private property. The delegation is so clearly 
. . . a denial of rights safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment . . . .”). 
3  See, e.g., Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 352-54 (1974) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting) (describing the nondelegation doctrine that “was briefly in vogue in the 1930’s” as 
being “surely as moribund as the substantive due process approach of the same era”); Synar v. United 
States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1383 (D.D.C.), aff ’d sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (“[T]he 
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As a formal matter, the nondelegation doctrine is widely thought to 
require that any statute that authorizes agencies to make legally binding rules 
must contain an “intelligible principle” to cabin the exercise of governmental 
authority.4 But for decades the Supreme Court has “upheld, without 
exception, delegations under standards phrased in sweeping terms.”5 Among 
the approved statutory authorizations have been those accompanied by 
principles such as those of “public convenience, interest, or necessity,” which 
seem far from intelligible in any ordinary sense.6 As a result, administrative 
agencies today possess a considerable accumulation of rulemaking authority.7 
Recognition of the sweeping quality of the rulemaking authorizations 
approved by the Supreme Court, however, does not necessarily mean that the 
nondelegation doctrine has died, nor that the Court has failed to apply it 
faithfully, as some scholars and judges assert.8 On the contrary, the Court 
 
Supreme Court’s failure to use the delegation doctrine to strike down a statute in fifty years . . . led 
some to conclude that the delegation doctrine is dead, or at least ‘moribund.’”); Matthew D. Adler, 
Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Countermajoritarian Diffi culty, 145 U. PA. L. 
REV. 759, 839 (1997) (noting that “we live in a constitutional world where the nondelegation doctrine 
remains dead”); Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 713 
(1969) (“The non-delegation doctrine is almost a complete failure.”); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian 
Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 419 (2015) (“After the Court’s 
unanimous decision [in Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001)], it would be fair to 
say this of the nondelegation doctrine: dead again.”). It should be acknowledged, of course, that not 
everyone thinks the nondelegation doctrine is an entirely failed or moribund experiment. See 
generally Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are 
Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297 (2003); Jason Iuliano & Keith E. Whittington, The 
Non-Delegation Doctrine: Alive and Well, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 619 (2017); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000). As subsequently explained in the body of this 
Article, I join with those who see the doctrine as still alive.  
4 See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (“If Congress shall 
lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] 
is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”). 
See generally infra Part II. 
5 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996); see also KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD 
J. PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 132 (6th ed. 2019) (“The Court has become 
increasingly candid in recognizing its inability to enforce any meaningful limitation on Congress’ 
power to delegate its legislative power to an appropriate institution.”). 
6 Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943). See also Fed. Radio Comm’n v. 
Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortg. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933) (“In granting licenses the Commission 
is required to act ‘as public convenience, interest or necessity requires.’”). Richard Pierce has 
characterized such standards as “empty” ones, explaining that Congress could alternatively provide 
agencies with standards that are “functionally equivalent” in their emptiness, such as unranked lists 
of decisional factors or contradictory standards. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and 
Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 474-478 (1985). 
7 For a vigorous critique of this administrative authority, see generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, 
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993). 
8 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Depravity of the 1930s and the Modern 
Administrative State, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 821, 855 (2018) (arguing that “[t]he Supreme Court 
has decided not to enforce the constitutional principle against subdelegation”); Marci A. Hamilton, 
Representation and Nondelegation: Back to Basics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 807 (1999) (accusing the 
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continues to affirm the existence of the nondelegation doctrine. Moreover, it 
has also applied it with greater consistency and coherence than generally 
recognized. But this coherence only becomes evident in light of what I call the 
“dimensionality” of authority: that is, not only the degree of constraint that 
legislation places on the exercise of governmental authority, as called for by 
the intelligible principle test, but also the extent of the power authorized. 
My principal aim in this Article is positive and conceptual. After 
introducing the core question underlying the nondelegation doctrine and 
explaining how the intelligible principle test is supposed to answer that 
question, I show that the dominant emphasis on intelligibility only gives rise 
to a further doctrinal puzzle: How can the nondelegation doctrine still exist 
when the Court over decades has approved so many pieces of legislation with 
fairly unintelligible principles? The answer to this puzzle emerges from 
recognition that the intelligibility of any principle dictating the basis for 
lawmaking is but one characteristic defining that authority. The Court has 
acknowledged five other characteristics that, taken together with the 
intelligible principle, constitute the full dimensionality of any grant of 
lawmaking authority and hold the key to a more coherent rendering of the 
Court’s application of the nondelegation doctrine. 
Simplifying, I illustrate how the nondelegation doctrine, properly 
understood, concerns both the degree of discretion afforded to the holder of 
lawmaking power and the extent of the underlying power itself. I also show how 
a textual commitment to the Constitution’s Vesting Clause calls for judges to 
consider how lawmaking authority conferred by a statute compares with a 
specific legislative power “herein granted” in Article I. The proper test for the 
nondelegation doctrine, I thus explain, calls upon a judge to invalidate only those 
statutory grants of lawmaking authority that approximate one of Congress’s 
enumerated powers along both the discretion and power dimensions. 
So understood, the nondelegation doctrine remains alive, and is more 
manageable and coherent too, even if it has almost never been invoked to strike 
down legislation authorizing lawmaking by executive officers. Its infrequent use 
to invalidate legislation—even when these laws impose minimal decisionmaking 
constraint—is not a function of judicial confusion or of the Supreme Court’s 
abandonment of the doctrine. It is instead a function of the doctrine itself being 
grounded in more than just an intelligible principle test—and of the fact that 
 
Court of “avoiding its own constitutional obligation to keep the branches within the Constitution’s 
prescribed parameters” by “declin[ing] to enforce the Constitution’s rule requiring the legislature to 
make the laws”); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive 
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2097 (2004) (describing the current version of the 
nondelegation doctrine as “unenforced”); David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court 
Give it Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1231 (1985) (noting that “the Court has seemed prepared 
to uphold almost any statute as acceptable delegation”). 
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legislation only infrequently seeks to effectuate grants of authority that reach 
the extremes on both dimensions of delegation. 
I. THE NONDELEGATION ISSUE 
The Constitution expressly acknowledges that the U.S. government 
comprises executive departments and officers—and, by extension, it 
acknowledges that these departments and officers possess discretion.9 But the 
text and structure of the Constitution also places primacy on Congress as the 
source of legislative authority: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States.”10 The Supreme Court has long 
recognized that this Vesting Clause contained in Article I, Section 1 means that 
Congress may not transfer its legislative powers to another governmental body 
or official.11 If Congress were to transfer its legislative powers, then it could, by 
itself, override the Constitution’s express scheme for bicameralism and 
presentment in lawmaking—not to mention the prescribed means for amending 
the Constitution. 
Yet these long-settled doctrinal propositions do not lead to any automatic 
conclusion about the authorization of rulemaking by executive officials. The 
potential for the exercise of rulemaking authority by departments and 
executive officers is not expressly addressed in the text of the Constitution. 
Is administrative rulemaking a species of the “legislative powers herein 
granted” that Article I, Section 1 vests in Congress? The Constitution does 
not explicitly say. It does, though, authorize Congress to adopt all laws that 
 
9 Executive departments and officers are acknowledged twice in Section 2 of Article II of the 
Constitution, and officers are recognized in Sections 3 and 4 of Article II. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, 
cls. 1-2; U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 3, 4. Departments and officers are also mentioned in the Necessary 
and Proper Clause of Article I. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. That the heads of these departments 
would possess some degree of discretion in their actions seems implicitly acknowledged in the Take 
Care Clause of Article II. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. The Take Care Clause does not by its terms 
directly impose an obligation on the President to execute the laws faithfully—that duty follows from 
the oath of office provided elsewhere in Article II. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. Rather, the President’s 
“take care” duty is to make sure that the laws are faithfully executed, namely by those other officers 
who make up the executive branch in the exercise of their discretion. See Peter Strauss, Overseer, or “The 
Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 703 (2007). 
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
11 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“Article I, §1, of the 
Constitution vests ‘[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted . . . in a Congress of the United States.’ 
This test permits no delegation of those powers . . . .”); see also Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 
160, 165 (1991) (noting that the Court “has derived the nondelegation doctrine” from the Vesting 
Clause); A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935) (“The Congress 
is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it 
is thus vested.”); Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That Congress cannot 
delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the 
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.”). 
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are “necessary and proper” to carry out its powers. Congress has deemed it 
to be “necessary” from the earliest days of the Republic to grant other 
governmental actors authority to establish rules.12 The Supreme Court has 
also recognized the necessity of such congressional empowerment.13 
Even if necessary, are congressional grants of rulemaking authority also 
“proper?” Certainly nothing in the Constitution expressly precludes 
Congress from authorizing the heads of departments to create rules, even 
though it does impose a series of other clear prohibitions on Congress in 
Article I, Section 9.14 But if rulemaking is an Article I “legislative power,” 
then Congress may not permissibly authorize others to exercise it. 
In one sense, rulemaking certainly looks legislative, because it results in 
binding rules that are fully enforceable as law. These binding rules are even 
called “legislative rules.”15 Yet despite these similarities in semantics as well 
as form, rulemaking power is not necessarily the same as a “legislative power,” 
at least not for purposes of the Vesting Clause.16 
 
12 As other scholars have amply pointed out, starting with the earliest Congresses, legislation has 
expressly authorized the President or other officers to establish rules and policies with respect to various 
matters. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE 
LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 43-47 (2012) (discussing early 
legislation that authorized executive officers to establish certain rules related to postal services, 
pensions, and banking); Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 738-39 
(1994) (providing examples of early congressional delegations of power over areas such as patents, 
military patents, and trade with Indian tribes); Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1735-36 (2002) (listing early statutes delegating power 
to the executive); Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 331-
32 (1999) (“[E]arly practice suggested considerable willingness to ‘delegate’ authority.”). 
13 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“Congress simply cannot do 
its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”); Sunshine Anthracite 
Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940) (“Delegation by Congress has long been recognized as 
necessary in order that the exertion of legislative power does not become a futility.”). 
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; see also, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 322 (“The 
Constitution does grant legislative power to Congress, but it does not in terms forbid delegations 
of that power . . . .”). 
15 E.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015) (“Rules issued through the 
notice-and-comment process are often referred to as ‘legislative rules’ because they have the ‘force 
and effect of law.’” (citation omitted)). 
16 See, e.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516 (1911) (“Congress was merely 
conferring administrative functions upon an agent, and not delegating to him legislative power.”); 
see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 776-77 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“While it has 
become the practice in our opinions to refer to ‘unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority’ 
versus ‘lawful delegations of legislative authority,’ in fact the latter category does not exist . . . . 
What Congress does is to assign responsibilities to the Executive.”). Of course, Justice John Paul 
Stevens called it mere “pretend” to think administrative rulemaking is anything but the exercise of 
legislative power. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 488 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(“I am persuaded that it would be both wiser and more faithful to what we have actually done in 
delegation cases to admit that agency rulemaking authority is ‘legislative power.’”). Stevens still 
accepted that a grant of rulemaking authority must be “adequately limited by the terms of the 
authorizing statute,” suggesting that the underlying nondelegation doctrine analysis does not hinge 
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Administrative rulemaking, after all, can constitute a type of executive 
power. Undeniably, executive officers responsible for implementing legislation 
must often create rules to carry out their duties.17 Even one of the “purest” of 
executive functions—the delivery of mail—depends on a postmaster’s power 
to create binding rules.18 Congress has recognized the need for administrators 
to make rules by repeatedly authorizing executive officials to make them in 
the course of carrying out their executive responsibilities.19 
The Court thus has had to reconcile two seemingly competing 
propositions: first, that Article I’s vesting of legislative powers in Congress 
does not permit Congress to transfer those powers to another entity; and, 
second, that Congress may (and frequently does) authorize rulemaking by the 
President or administrative agencies. The judicial challenge has been to 
distinguish Congress’s permissible authorizations of executive authority to 
make rules from any impermissible delegations of legislative powers vested 
in Congress by Article I. That is the very issue that the nondelegation 
doctrine seeks to address, drawing the line between permissible and 
 
on what label one places on the lawmaking authority granted to an agency. Id. at 458. But Stevens’s 
view does not reflect the Court’s accepted position. 
17 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 304 n.4 (2013) (“Agencies make rules . . . and 
have done so since the beginning of the Republic . . . but they are exercises of—indeed, under our 
constitutional structure they must be exercises of—the ‘executive Power.’”); Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. 
at 475 (majority opinion) (“[A] certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most 
executive or judicial action.” (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting))); see also, e.g., 
Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1005 (2015) (noting that “the Court 
insists . . . that rulemaking activities by administrative agencies must constitute exercises of the 
‘executive Power’ found in Article II of the Constitution”); John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as 
Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 2020 (2011) (noting that it is “no less accurate to say 
that when an agency implements an organic act by promulgating rules pursuant to an intelligible 
principle, that agency is, in fact, executing the law”); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and 
the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2094 (2005) (noting that the 
implementation of legislation “necessarily involves a considerable amount of policymaking”). 
18 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106 (1926) (treating a postmaster as an executive 
officer); see also Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935) (describing a 
postmaster as a “purely executive officer”). For an earlier treatment of postal rulemaking authority, 
see Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918), and MASHAW, supra note 12, at 46 (describing 
authority given by the Second Congress to the Postmaster General to “provide for additional post 
roads and to decide where to set up post offices . . . and to prescribe regulations for his subordinates 
as he found necessary”). 
19 Such rulemaking, like other executive powers, is of course always subordinate to legislative 
power in the sense that legislation always prevails in the event of conflicts between administrative 
rules and legislation. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring) (“When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied 
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.”); see also Merrill, supra note 8, at 2112 (“[A]gency 
regulations have the force of law only if Congress has delegated authority to promulgate them.”). 
As discussed in Part IV, Merrill views rulemaking’s subordination to legislation as pivotal to 
resolving the constitutional issues implicated by the nondelegation doctrine; however, as I explain 
there, the subordinated status of executive rulemaking does not adequately explain the Court’s 
approach in nondelegation cases. 
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impermissible grants of lawmaking authority by Congress to executive 
officers.20 When a grant to executive officers accords with the nondelegation 
doctrine, it will be deemed, by definition, a grant of constitutionally 
permissible rulemaking authority—an executive power—not the transfer of a 
legislative power vested in Congress. 
II. THE INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE TEST 
To determine the permissibility of a grant of lawmaking authority to 
executive officers, the Supreme Court has long invoked the intelligible 
principle test.21 Under this test, a grant of lawmaking authority will not be 
deemed tantamount to “legislative power” vested in Congress if an executive 
officer’s discretion in exercising that authority is sufficiently constrained by 
some fairly cognizable criterion. 
Congress’s Article I legislative powers are, after all, virtually 
unconstrained in terms of any decisionmaking criterion that Congress must 
follow. The Constitution does provide minimal procedural constraints and 
substantive limits, such as those in Article I, Section 9 or in the Bill of Rights. 
Yet in exercising its enumerated powers in Article I, Congress is not 
constrained by an additional principle telling it the basis on which it must 
decide whether or how to exercise those powers, such as when or how it can 
regulate interstate commerce. Indeed, in most cases the justification for, or 
basis of, Congress’s exercise of its legislative power must simply meet an 
extremely minimal threshold of rationality. As long as government lawyers 
later can provide a court with some reason to justify a piece of legislation, it 
will pass muster under a rational basis standard that some commentators 
consider to be effectively no standard at all.22 
 
20 The nondelegation doctrine applies to congressional grants of lawmaking authority to 
judicial officers as well. See Margaret Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and 
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 405 (2008). As most grants of lawmaking authority are 
made to executive officers, and almost all relevant cases have arisen in the context of grants to 
executive officers, this Article simplifies its analysis by focusing just on executive officers. The 
analysis provided here, though, would also apply to grants of lawmaking authority to the judiciary. 
21 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 236 (2005) (describing “the dominant modern formulation 
. . . that regards an ‘intelligible principle’ as the touchstone for a constitutional grant of discretion” 
to an executive officer); John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 
SUP. CT. REV. 223, 240 (2000) (“Under black-letter law, the Court will uphold any organic statute 
that supplies an ‘intelligible principle’ to channel agency discretion.”); Cass R. Sunstein, The 
American Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1181, 1189 (2018) (“Above all, the standard 
[nondelegation] doctrine is designed to ensure that Congress does not ‘delegate’ its lawmaking 
functions and that it supplies an ‘intelligible principle’ for the executive branch to follow.”). 
22 See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Jackson, Putting Rationality Back into the Rational Basis Test: Saving 
Substantive Due Process and Redeeming the Promise of the Ninth Amendment, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 491, 
493 (2011) (“By allowing any plausible reason for . . . legislation to suffice, whether or not it was a 
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By contrast, when Congress authorizes lawmaking by executive officers 
under the terms of an intelligible principle, the officials’ discretion will be 
cabined by that principle which indicates the appropriate rationale or basis 
for the officials’ decisionmaking. Authorized executive rulemaking authority 
will thus be both subordinate to legislation and constrained in a way that 
makes it unlike a legislative power of the type Article I vests in Congress. 
From its earliest cases on the subject, the Supreme Court has accepted 
legislation authorizing other governmental actors to make rules, as such 
rulemaking authority has been constrained to a degree that Congress is never 
constrained. In 1825, Chief Justice John Marshall described a statutory grant 
of rulemaking authority as merely constituting a power “to fill up the 
details.”23 The Court later upheld presidential tariff authority in 1892 because 
it viewed the relevant legislation as simply calling for the President to make 
a “contingent” factual determination.24 
By 1928, in J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,25 another case involving 
presidential tariff authority, the Court first articulated constraints on 
rulemaking authority in terms of an “intelligible principle.” The Court in 
Hampton upheld legislation granting the President authority to increase tariffs 
because the statute stated that the exercise of this authority was to “equalize . . . 
costs of production in the United States and the principal competing 
country.”26 The statute, in articulating the basis on which Presidents could make 
tariff decisions in terms of equalizing costs, thus placed constraints on those 
decisions in a manner unlike the unbounded nature of a “legislative power” 
vested in Congress. Article I of the Constitution simply states that “Congress 
shall have the power to lay and collect . . . duties, imposts, and excises” and “to 
regulate commerce with foreign nations.”27 It does not limit the basis for 
Congress’s exercise of these powers to equalizing costs across nations.28 
When the Court struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act in 
1935, it likewise considered whether the statute contained a principle or 
standard to constrain decisionmaking in the exercise of the granted 
 
true reason for the legislation, . . . the Court has essentially made the rational basis test the 
equivalent to no test at all.”). 
23 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825); see also United States v. Grimaud, 
220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911) (invoking an agency’s “power to fill up the details” in upholding a statute 
against a nondelegation challenge). 
24 Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 699 (1892). 
25 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
26 Id. at 401. 
27  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
28 The only way Article I limits Congress’s tariff authority is by requiring that any established 
tariffs be uniform across all the states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 
2019] Dimensions of Delegation 1857 
authority.29 The Act authorized the President to approve codes of “fair 
competition” for various industry sectors.30 The unanimous Schechter Poultry 
Court concluded that the Act provided “no standards” to guide presidential 
approval of such codes, leaving the President’s discretion “virtually 
unfettered.”31 Justice Benjamin Cardozo, writing in concurrence, vividly 
observed that the lawmaking authority Congress had authorized in the Act 
was “not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.”32 
In the years since Schechter Poultry, the Court has repeatedly quoted the 
Hampton Court’s formulation of the need for a statutory grant of rulemaking 
authority to be accompanied by an intelligible principle.33 The Court has even 
subsequently described this as “[t]he intelligible-principle rule.”34 Yet the 
Court has not since 1935 found any other piece of legislation to offend this 
rule. The upshot of this widely accepted account of the nondelegation 
doctrine is that, as Cass Sunstein has put it, Congress violates the doctrine 
only if it gives the President or agencies a completely “‘blank check,’ or states 
no intelligible principle” whatsoever.35 
III. THE INTELLIGIBILITY PUZZLE 
Despite the Court’s longstanding claim that the intelligible principle test 
constitutes the core of the nondelegation doctrine, what the test actually 
demands in terms of the intelligibility of a principle is far from clear. What 
exactly makes a principle “intelligible?” How intelligible is intelligible enough? 
The answers to these questions have never been entirely clear—or, one 
might say, fully intelligible. In addition to intrinsic difficulties in drawing 
 
29 See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935) (“[W]e look 
to the statute to see . . . whether Congress in authorizing ‘codes of fair competition’ has itself 
established the standards of legal obligation, thus performing its essential legislative function, or, by 
the failure to enact such standards, has attempted to transfer that function to others.”); Pan. Refining 
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 415 (1935) (noting that the Court looks to the statute to see “whether the 
Congress has declared a policy with respect to that subject” and “whether the Congress has set up a 
standard for the President’s action”). 
30 Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 530. 
31 Id. at 541-42. 
32 Id. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
33 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting J.W. Hampton, 
Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)) (“[W]e repeatedly have said that when 
Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress must ‘lay down by legislative 
act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.’” 
(emphasis removed)); see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 484 (1998) (quoting 
Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409) (“[T]he Constitution permits only those delegations where Congress 
‘shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to 
[act] is directed to conform.’” (emphasis removed)). 
34 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996). 
35 Sunstein, supra note 12, at 331. 
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lines based on the concept of intelligibility, the Court has never clearly 
articulated how it could approve statutes containing decisionmaking 
principles that seem as sweeping or vague as those in the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, if not more so. The intelligibility test has thus led to an 
intelligibility puzzle.36 
This puzzle arises because, in the first instance, the National Industrial 
Recovery Act did in fact contain criteria purporting to guide presidential 
decisionmaking. The Supreme Court in Schechter Poultry recognized that the 
statute required the President, before approving any code, to make specific 
findings about the fairness of the process by which the proposed code had 
been developed and to find that the proposed code would neither “promote 
monopolies” nor “eliminate or oppress small enterprises.”37 In addition, as the 
Court also noted, before approving a proposed industry code the President 
needed to find that the code would “‘tend to effectuate the policy’ of Title I 
of the Act.”38 That policy, in the 166-word opening section of the Act, stated 
that the Act was intended, among other things, to “remove obstructions to 
the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce,” “eliminate unfair 
competitive practices,” “increase the consumption of industrial and 
agricultural products,” “reduce and relieve unemployment,” “improve 
standards of labor,” and “conserve natural resources.”39 
The specification of these policies in the statute belies the inference that 
the Act contained absolutely “no standards” whatsoever—at least not literally 
so. Still, these phrases are admittedly quite spongy. They do not really limit 
the basis upon which a President could justify the adoption of nearly any 
industry code. Does not what constitutes an “unfair” business practice lie in 
the eye of the beholder? How much “obstruction” of commerce is enough to 
justify regulation? Will not a President always think that new labor rules will 
“improve” existing standards?  
Not only did such vague terms provide no meaningful constraint, but the 
Act only required the President to find that a new code would “tend” to 
promote one or more of these stated policies. Clearly, the presence of 
numerous words in the Act did not keep it from amounting to the functional 
equivalent of a blank check. 
The puzzle of intelligibility arises, though, when the effectively vacuous 
standards of the National Industrial Recovery Act are compared with their 
counterparts in various statutes that the Court has upheld in the face of 
 
36 See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 315, 318 n.15 (describing the nondelegation cases as creating a 
“puzzling line of doctrine”). 
37 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 522 (1935). 
38 Id. at 523 (quoting National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 3, 48 Stat. 
195, 195 (1933)). 
39 Id. at 534-35 (quoting National Industrial Recovery Act § 3). 
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nondelegation challenges, even though these counterparts also seem 
functionally equivalent to a blank check.40 In addition to upholding the 
Federal Communications Commission’s authority to regulate broadcasting 
based only on “the public interest, convenience, or necessity,”41 the Court has 
upheld the congressional authorization of price controls at levels that the 
government administrator merely deems “generally fair and equitable.”42 It 
has upheld administratively imposed milk price controls at levels that simply 
“reflect” various economic conditions, provide for a “sufficient” volume of 
milk, and are found to advance “the public interest.”43 It has allowed Congress 
to authorize the Attorney General to designate a drug as a controlled 
substance—a designation backed up with criminal sanctions for unlawful 
possession—as long as doing so is “necessary to avoid an imminent hazard.”44 
In its American Trucking decision in 2001, the Court approved Congress’s 
decision in the Clean Air Act to authorize the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency to set air quality standards which, in the 
Administrator’s “judgment,” would be “requisite to protect the public health” 
and would “allow[] an adequate margin of safety.”45 The Agency had assumed 
 
40 In cases before and after Schechter Poultry, the Supreme Court has also held that Congress 
need not provide a principle for exercising delegated authority that is any more specific than is 
“reasonably practicable.” See, e.g., United States v. Royal Rock Co-Operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 574 
(1939) (“Congress needs specify only so far as is reasonably practicable.”); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 
192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904) (“Congress legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable, 
and from the necessities of the case was compelled to leave to executive officials the duty of bringing 
about the result pointed out by the statute.”); see also Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 
105 (1946) (“Necessity . . . fixes a point beyond which it is unreasonable and impracticable to compel 
Congress to prescribe detailed rules . . . .”). 
41 Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943). 
42 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944). 
43 Royal Rock Co-Operative, 307 U.S. at 539-40, 542 n.4, 575-77. 
44 Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 160 (1991). 
45 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2012). Until 2019, the unanimous American Trucking decision had been the 
Supreme Court’s latest major treatment of the nondelegation doctrine. Despite speculation that the 
Court would use Gundy v. United States to change its analytic approach to the nondelegation doctrine, it 
did not do so when that decision was handed down in June 2019. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 
2116 (2019). As of this writing, months after the Court handed down its decision in Gundy, the Court has 
yet to rule on a post-decision petition in that case urging the Court to rehear the case. See John Elwood, 
SCOTUSBLOG (OCT. 9, 2019, 3:38 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/10/relist-watch-150 [https://
perma.cc/B4WL-LQ3U]. Gundy’s lawyers have argued in their petition for rehearing that, due to a 
vacancy created by the retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court had only eight members when 
Gundy was argued, and further that the current approach to the nondelegation doctrine has been 
questioned by four of the eight Justices participating in the Court’s decision, including Justice Samuel 
Alito, who authored a decisive concurring opinion in the case. See Petition for Rehearing at 1-4, Gundy, 
139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (No. 17-6086), 2019 WL 3202508, at *1-4. Justice Alito’s concurrence expressed a 
willingness on his part to “support” a reconsideration of the Court’s approach to the nondelegation 
doctrine “[i]f a majority of this Court were willing” to do so. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (Alito, J., 
concurring). Justice Neil Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice 
Clarence Thomas, raised concerns with the Court’s current approach to the nondelegation doctrine. Id. 
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that adverse health effects would occur from any non-zero level of ozone and 
particulate matter pollution in the ambient air, which led the lower court to 
conclude that the statute, as understood by the agency, contained no 
“determinate criteria for drawing lines” and thus lacked any intelligible 
guidance as to how the Administrator should set standards.46 On review, the 
Supreme Court reversed, dismissing the lower court’s concerns about the lack 
of a principle to guide the agency in drawing a line. According to Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s opinion for the unanimous Court, the Clean Air Act’s 
principle—“requisite to protect the public health” with an “adequate” margin 
of protection—was sufficiently intelligible, sitting “comfortably within the 
scope of discretion permitted by our precedent.”47 
The Court was surely correct about how the Clean Air Act’s principle fit 
with post-Schechter Poultry precedent, but what does that say about the 
National Industrial Recovery Act? In light of the Court’s decisions since the 
1930s, was Schechter Poultry wrongly decided because the New Deal statute’s 
constraints were no more vacuous than those the Court has since approved? 
Or has the Court simply abandoned a doctrine that it previously thought 
proper to apply in Schechter Poultry? These questions reveal the seeming 
inconsistency that has led commentators to decry the Court’s incoherent 
application of the nondelegation doctrine, and even its total abandonment. 
Indeed, the Court’s disapproval of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
cannot be squared with its subsequent approval of other legislation with 
comparably spongy principles by looking solely through the lens of the 
intelligible principle test—that is, by examining statutes’ stated principles 
guiding the exercise of rulemaking authority. The problem is that this is too 
narrow of a view of these statutes. What looks incoherent or puzzling from the 
sole standpoint of the intelligible principle test—which itself cannot be made 
all that intelligible—need not look so puzzling from a broader perspective.48 
IV. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF INHERENCY AND DERIVATION 
The path toward a broader and clearer perspective begins by distinguishing 
between three distinct but interrelated concepts: (1) action; (2) power or 
authority; and (3) discretion. Government agencies or officials can take a 
 
at 2135-36, 2141-42 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). I discuss Justice Gorsuch’s critique and suggested alternative 
approach infra in Part VIII. 
46 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472, 475 (2001) (quoting Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns v. U.S. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (1999)). 
47 Id. at 472, 476. 
48 Cf. Cary Coglianese, Bounded Evaluation: Cognition, Incoherence, and Regulatory Policy, 54 
STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1219 (2002) (showing that policies that seem incoherent on the surface can be 
coherent once other factors are considered). 
 
2019] Dimensions of Delegation 1861 
variety of actions, one of which is to make laws. When an agency or official has 
been duly granted legal authorization to undertake an action, then that agency 
or official can be said to have the power or authority to take that action. In 
determining whether and how to exercise power or authority, decisionmakers 
possess varying degrees of discretion, depending on how tightly their choices 
about taking the authorized action are constrained by rules or principles.49 In 
its typical formulation, the intelligible principle test is said to demand that 
legislation sufficiently constrain an executive officer’s choices about exercising 
authority to issue rules on a particular subject—that is, the officer’s discretion. 
These three concepts help illuminate the typical (albeit narrow) 
articulation of the nondelegation doctrine. Judges and scholars appear to 
assume that nontransferable “legislative powers” are simply any powers to 
undertake the action of making law. This assumption no doubt stems from 
the fact that, from a certain vantage point, executive rulemaking looks like 
the same kind of action the Constitution grants to Congress: namely, 
lawmaking. If both rulemaking authority and legislative power are 
functionally identical, then that would seem to leave only the amount of 
discretion possessed by the lawmaker as the way to distinguish a permissible 
grant of rulemaking authority from an impermissible delegation of legislative 
power. The intelligible principle test is supposed to measure, so to speak, that 
amount of discretion. A statute will be constitutional as long as an executive 
officer’s discretion is not unbounded in the way that Congress’s is. 
The emphasis on discretion comes through in the Court’s canonical 
statement of the intelligible principle test in Hampton: “If Congress shall lay 
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body 
authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is 
not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”50 The Court made clear in 
that case that the action involved the establishment of binding tariff rates, 
with the statute’s principle of cost equalization serving to constrain the 
President’s discretion in undertaking that action.  
In subsequent cases, the Court has similarly described the intelligible 
principle as a purported constraint on discretion in the exercise of authorized 
action.51 The Touby Court, for example, spoke of “restrictions on the Attorney 
General’s discretion to define criminal conduct.”52 In Mistretta, the Court 
 
49 See Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 645, 652-
653 (1991). 
50  J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
51 See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 318; Manning, supra note 21, at 240. 
52 Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 167 (1991). 
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considered whether “Congress has set forth sufficient standards for the 
exercise of the Commission’s delegated authority”—or its “discretion.”53 
But the degree of discretion is not the only way to distinguish rulemaking 
authority from a legislative power. As Thomas Merrill has helpfully 
suggested, a legislative power of the kind vested in Congress can have other 
properties that make it different from rulemaking authority. Merrill notes 
that one key difference is what he calls the former’s “inherency.”54 That is, 
legislative power derives inherently from the Constitution. By contrast, 
rulemaking authority is not inherent in an administrative agency but is 
instead derivative of and dependent upon statutory authorization.55 The 
administrator’s authority depends on Congress exercising its legislative 
power to authorize rulemaking action.56 The derivative nature of rulemaking 
means that courts must confine the exercise of such authority to the terms of 
its underlying legislative grant. The derivative nature of rulemaking authority 
also means that Congress can use its legislative power to override or nullify 
the legal effect of any specific provision in an administrative rule—and can 
even use it to take back entirely any authorization of rulemaking authority.57 
Merrill correctly distinguishes between derived and inherent powers, and 
his observations point in a helpful direction for anyone interested in the 
nondelegation doctrine because they highlight the need to focus more 
precisely on what “legislative power” means and how it differs from 
rulemaking authority. The need to distinguish nondelegable legislative power 
from a permissible grant of rulemaking authority is, after all, the need that 
the intelligible principle test has purported to fulfill.58 
Yet neither the inherency of legislative power nor the derivative nature of 
rulemaking authority will fully resolve the question of what distinguishes 
permissible from impermissible grants of lawmaking authority.59 This is 
 
53 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379-80 (1989); see also Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO 
v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (noting that “the doctrine 
guarantees that, to the extent Congress finds it necessary to delegate authority, it provides the recipient 
of that authority with an ‘intelligible principle’ to guide the exercise of the delegated discretion”). 
54 Merrill, supra note 8, at 2101. 
55 This is, of course, putting to the side the separate possibility that some inherent powers 
might derive from Article II directly. 
56 Merrill, supra note 8, at 2101. 
57 Cf. Cary Coglianese & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Securing Subsidiarity: The Institutional Design of 
Federalism in the United States and Europe, in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF 
GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 277, 293-94 (Kalypso 
Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001) (discussing principals’ option of reversing the delegation of 
authority to their agents). 
58 See supra Part I. 
59 Of course, Merrill uses these characteristics not so much to derive a principled, positive 
account of how the Court has applied the nondelegation doctrine (which is the principal goal of this 
Article). Instead, he argues for a doctrine of exclusive delegation which holds that Article I, Section 
 
2019] Dimensions of Delegation 1863 
because the question underlying the nondelegation doctrine is already 
motivated by a recognition that legislative power is inherent, for that is what 
Article I’s vesting accomplishes. The nondelegation question also necessarily 
accepts that even a transfer of legislative power would be derivative, for that 
is what it means to delegate.60 What courts need, if they are to answer the 
question underlying the nondelegation doctrine, is a test or method separate 
from inherency and derivation by which to distinguish a permissible 
(derivative) grant of rulemaking power from an impermissible (but still 
derivative) authorization of the exercise of legislative power. 
V. SIX DEGREES OF DELEGATION 
By looking again at the way that the Supreme Court has handled 
nondelegation cases throughout history, it is possible to discern a meaningful 
test at work that distinguishes between permissible and impermissible 
authorizations of lawmaking power. Such a test requires taking into account 
the totality of the relevant characteristics of a grant of lawmaking authority. 
Lawmaking authority, after all, is not unlike property. The collection of 
rights in different types of property has long been compared to a “bundle of 
sticks.”61 A grant of lawmaking authority likewise consists of distinct sticks or 
features which together are constitutive of that authority. The degree of 
intelligibility to a principle constraining discretion is one of those “sticks,” 
but just one within a larger bundle that together can distinguish rulemaking 
authority from legislative power. Taking the larger bundle of characteristics 
 
1 requires executive officers to possess delegated authority from Congress before they can exercise 
lawmaking authority. Merrill, supra note 8, at 2109-14. Merrill offers both constitutional and 
consequentialist arguments to reject the use of the nondelegation doctrine in favor of relying on an 
exclusive delegation reading of Article I, Section 1. Id. at 2165-66. These arguments merit attention 
but go beyond the present purpose of this Article. 
60 Coglianese & Nicolaidis, supra note 57. 
61 In raising the bundle metaphor, I recognize that some property law scholars now resist this 
conceptualization. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More 
Coasean, 54 J.L. & ECON. S77, S82 (2011) (expressing concern with the implications of the bundle-
of-rights conception as treating property merely “as a kind of master list of rights and duties set 
forth by some authoritative state institution for each type of property or indeed for each particular 
parcel of property”); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Why Restate the Bundle?: The 
Disintegration of the Restatement of Property, 79 BROOKLYN L. REV. 681, 682-83 (2014) (dismissing the 
bundle of rights orientation as “a substantive theory of property as a formless and infinitely 
malleable collection of rules to be shaped in accordance with ad hoc perceptions of public policy”). 
Even if the metaphor has grown out of fashion in some quarters, a more essentialist view of property 
cannot deny that different types of property arrangements come with different sets of rights and 
legal relationships, which is my main point. See, e.g., Katrina Wyman, The New Essentialism in 
Property, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 183, 205 (2017) (arguing that “the new essentialist approach is 
considerably more open to multiple values and forms of property than the critics—and new 
essentialists—imply”). 
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into account, the Court’s approach to the nondelegation doctrine—that is, 
invoking it to invalidate the National Industrial Recovery Act but not any 
other laws—no longer need seem incoherent at all. 
Any grant of authority exhibits six key characteristics.62 We might even 
refer to them as six degrees of delegation.63 In this Part, I specify these 
characteristics—the sticks that make up the authority bundle—and then, in 
the next Part, I show how putting these characteristics together can allow 
judges to distinguish rulemaking authority from legislative power. 
In elaborating on each of the characteristics below, I point out how 
statutory grants of authority to executive officers have included these 
features and how each relates to the nondelegation doctrine.64 For ease of 
reference, I have divided the list of six characteristics into three groups—
“nature of action,” “extent of power,” and “degree of discretion”—a division 
which is not crucial here but will be referred to again in the next Part of this 
Article. The basic intuition, developed more fully in the next Part of this 
Article, is that a grant of lawmaking authority to an executive officer will be 
unconstitutional only when the combination of its characteristics makes the 
authority comparable to a power vested in Congress under one of the 
enumerations in Article I. 
 
Nature of Action 
 
1. Nature of Action (e.g., taking enforcement actions versus making 
binding rules) 
 
The nature of action authorized by a piece of legislation constitutes a 
threshold characteristic for any application of the nondelegation doctrine. If a 
statute is to be unconstitutional on nondelegation grounds, it is a necessary 
 
62 These core characteristics can also be said to delineate an agent’s power in any principal-
agent relationship. For general background on principal-agent theory and useful conceptual guides 
to delegation more broadly, see generally JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & DAVID MARTIMORT, THE 
THEORY OF INCENTIVES: THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL (2002); John W. Pratt & Richard J. 
Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An Overview, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE 
OF BUSINESS 1 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985); Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency 
Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 57 (1989). 
63 The parallel with the title of John Guare’s play Six Degrees of Separation is intended, but only 
as one of form. However, given that the play is about connectedness, it is interesting to note a 
connection between it and the intelligible principle test: the play, like the test, grew out of a case 
involving a man named Hampton. See Larry McShane, Con Man Who Sought Fame, Inspired Hit Play, 
Has Died, MOBILE REG., July 20, 2003, at A18, 2003 WLNR 15732472. 
64 Simply for ease of expression, each of the six characteristics of authority is presented here 
with a parenthetical example framed as a binary choice. In reality, only the first characteristic—the 
nature of action—is truly binary: that nature is either “legislative” in form or it is not. The other 
five characteristics array continuously along the relevant spectra. 
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(but not sufficient) condition that the statute authorizes an executive officer 
to make law in some fashion. A statute authorizing an executive officer to 
conduct a study or develop recommendations would be unproblematic on 
nondelegation grounds regardless of any other characteristic. Furthermore, if 
a statute authorizes other demonstrably executive actions—say, enforcement—
then nondelegation concerns will also not be relevant to those authorizations. 
The Supreme Court has expressly affirmed that any grant of authority to an 
executive officer to initiate enforcement actions is subject to virtually no legal 
constraint whatsoever.65 For an authorization to be even plausibly construed 
as a delegation of a legislative power, it must at a minimum authorize the 
making of law. 
 
Extent of Power 
 
2. Range of Regulated Targets (e.g., single industry versus the entire 
economy) 
 
Many statutes address a single industrial sector, whether it be 
telecommunications, nuclear energy, or milk production. Other statutes 
sweep across many or even all sectors of the economy by addressing concerns 
arising in many different types of businesses, such as environmental 
protection or worker safety. The more limited the range of possible regulated 
targets under a lawmaking authorization in a statute, the less the authority 
granted to the administrative agency will look like the kind of legislative 
power “herein granted” by Article I to regulate virtually the entire domain of 
economic activity under the Commerce Clause.66 It is notable in this regard 
that the statutory provision at issue in Schechter Poultry applied to the whole 
economy, authorizing the President to approve codes that could have 
addressed any industrial sector.67 It is also striking that, more recently, in 
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute,68 the 
Court appeared to have worried about the nondelegation issue in a dispute 
over the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s authority to 
impose standards on every workplace in the country.69 
 
65 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“This Court has recognized on several 
occasions over many years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through 
civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”). 
66 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
67 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553 (1935) (Cardozo, J., 
concurring) (“The extension [of authority under the National Industrial Recovery Act] becomes as 
wide as the field of industrial regulation.”). 
68 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
69 Id. at 611. Justice William Rehnquist would have used this case to invalidate the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act as violative of the nondelegation doctrine. See id. at 671-88 (Rehnquist, J., 
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3. Scope of Regulated Activities (e.g., placing limits on air pollution 
versus requiring fair business practices of any kind) 
 
Independent of the number of business firms or industrial sectors under 
potential regulatory control, a statute can authorize executive officers to make 
laws with respect to a narrow or wide range of activities undertaken by those 
firms or within those sectors.70 For example, even though environmental and 
occupational safety and health statutes authorize executive officers to make 
rules applicable across the entire economy, they still only authorize action 
addressing pollution or safe working conditions. They do not authorize actions 
that relate to other aspects of business operations or address other societal 
concerns. By contrast, the National Industrial Recovery Act authorized the 
President to approve codes addressing any and all aspects of economic activity: 
mergers and acquisitions, prices, purchasing decisions, employment practices, 
working conditions, and even environmental impacts—anything related to 
“fair competition” and the broad policies of the Act.71 
 
4. Degree of Sanctions (e.g., small penalties versus large penalties) 
 
Just as legislation can authorize the imposition of obligations on either a 
narrower or wider range of actors and actions, it can also provide for a range 
of penalties for violating these obligations. Congress can specify distinct 
 
concurring). Although the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) ambient air quality standards 
at issue in American Trucking in 2001 held implications for any industrial sector with polluting 
facilities, the EPA’s standard-setting authority under the Clean Air Act did not authorize the direct 
regulation of any private-sector actor. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473-74 
(2001). Even if an expansive, economy-wide impact of the Clean Air Act standards were conceded, 
the other facets of the delegation discussed below more than amply explain the Court’s rejection of 
the nondelegation challenge in American Trucking. See infra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
70 At this juncture, perhaps some readers may start to wonder whether a delegation’s definition 
of regulated targets (the second characteristic) and activities (the third characteristic) might simply 
constitute part of the conventional intelligible principle. It is true that the delegation’s definition of 
power in terms of targets and activities also necessarily constrains that power, something that could 
be said for any of a delegation’s six characteristics, as together they are constitutive of an executive 
officer’s authority. But, as discussed supra in Parts II and IV, and noted infra again in the present 
Part in connection with the fifth characteristic, the Court has treated the intelligible principle as a 
constraint on discretion in the exercise of delegated power—not as a means of determining the extent 
of that power itself. That said, if a reader prefers to think of the characteristics presented here as 
aspects of some new kind of all-encompassing intelligible principle, the important point would be 
to see that such a meta-principle would encompass all of these characteristics. All of the 
characteristics, however described, are collectively what turn out to be key to making better sense of 
how the Court has applied the nondelegation doctrine, as discussed in the next Part of this Article. 
71 National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 1, 48 Stat. 195, 195 (1933). As noted 
earlier, the Act authorized the President to approve codes that addressed the gamut of economic 
actions as long as doing so was consistent with a broad range of purposes, including “to conserve 
natural resources.” See supra text accompanying notes 37–39. 
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types of penalties—e.g., civil versus criminal—as well as different maximum 
penalty levels or different penalty ranges. All other things being equal, a grant 
of authority will be more significant when penalties are more severe. The 
National Industrial Recovery Act, for example, provided for criminal 
penalties for those businesses or individuals found to violate the 
presidentially imposed business codes the Act authorized.72 By contrast, the 
Clean Air Act provision at the heart of American Trucking did not put any 
business or individual at direct risk of any penalty, criminal or civil, because 
the provision imposed obligations on states which were backed up principally 
with the prospect of reductions in federal funding or federal preemptive 
action.73 Of course, this difference between the National Industrial Recovery 
Act and the Clean Air Act was far from dispositive. The Court has upheld 
numerous other statutes against nondelegation challenges even though they 
did provide for direct penalties—both civil and criminal.74 
 
Degree of Discretion 
 
5. Basis for Decisionmaking (e.g., clearly stated principle versus no 
principle) 
 
This fifth characteristic of authority is the traditional intelligible principle 
test, which I have already discussed in Parts II and III. To the extent that the 
basis for exercising lawmaking authority is constrained by a narrow, well-
defined principle, executive officers will have less discretion. For example, the 
statute authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to establish air bag rules 
for automobiles provides that the Secretary should seek “to improve occupant 
protection for occupants of different sizes, belted and unbelted . . . while 
 
72 See National Industrial Recovery Act § 3(f). 
73 The Clean Air Act provisions authorized the EPA to establish national air quality standards 
that states were obligated to devise plans to meet, under the threat of a potential cutoff of federal 
highway funds or the imposition of a federal implementation plan. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413, 
7477, 7509 (2012). Of course, indirectly the air quality standards do matter to private actors. Under 
the required state implementation plans, private actors can be subjected to subsequently imposed 
permit obligations backed up with civil penalties and, under certain circumstances, the possibility 
of criminal penalties. 
74 See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019) (upholding statute authorizing 
the Attorney General to establish by rule the application of sex offender notification to existing 
offenders, with criminal penalties possible for violation of the rule); Loving v. United States, 517 
U.S. 748, 768-69 (1996) (upholding statute authorizing President to establish aggravating factors for 
the imposition on military personnel of capital punishment for murder); Touby v. United States, 
500 U.S. 160, 162, 166 (1991) (upholding statute authorizing the Attorney General to define certain 
criminal conduct under the Controlled Substances Act); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 
518 (1911) (upholding statute authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to establish regulations that 
can be enforced with criminal sanctions). 
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minimizing the risk to infants, children, and other occupants from injuries 
and deaths caused by air bags.”75 That is clearly more constraining than a 
decisionmaking standard that, as a basis for the exercise of lawmaking 
authority, merely calls for deciding what would protect the “public interest” 
or reduce “unfair competition.” 
 
6. Extent of Required Process (e.g., transparent and participatory 
process versus no required process at all) 
 
Statutes will often require that executive officers follow specified 
procedures before exercising a grant of lawmaking authority, such as the 
rulemaking procedures contained in the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).76 Some of these procedures can be more demanding and constraining 
than others. In Schechter Poultry, the Court found it notable that the National 
Industrial Recovery Act dispensed with normal “administrative procedure and 
with any administrative procedure of an analogous character” in authorizing 
presidential approval of industry codes.77 This characteristic of authority has 
not subsequently figured into the reasoning of many other nondelegation cases 
in any significant way,78 making it less certain how consequential the extent of 
required process should be, ceteris paribus, in the nondelegation context. Still, 
the Court did acknowledge it in Schechter Poultry.79 
* * * 
This explication of six key characteristics of authority—and hence, 
characteristics of any delegation or grant of governmental authority—should on 
its own reveal the limited range of vision afforded by the intelligible principle 
test.80 A principle that provides the basis for the exercise of authority—and thus 
 
75 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Reauthorization Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-178, § 7103(a)(1), 112 Stat. 465, 466. 
76 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
77 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 533 (1935). 
78 For a relatively recent exception, see Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 489-90 
(1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
79 The addition, since 1946, of the APA’s procedural floor for agency rulemaking means that 
agencies should seldom find themselves in a procedural position like the President in Schechter Poultry. 
However, when authority is granted to the President, the APA affords no procedural constraint. 
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992); Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994). For this reason, 
plaintiffs in a recent nondelegation challenge to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 
which authorizes the President to adopt tariffs for broad national security reasons, have argued that 
the Supreme Court should either overrule or distinguish its earlier decision upholding this same 
statute in Fed. Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976), as it was decided 
prior to Franklin and Dalton. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (2012); Am. Institute for Int’l Steel, Inc. 
v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2748 (2019). 
80 Of course, this recitation of six characteristics is hardly to suggest that no other characteristic 
of authority could be conceived. In fact, another possibility might be the delegation’s duration (e.g., 
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the amount of discretion afforded to a decisionmaker—is but one of a variety of 
characteristics constituting a grant of authority. If the goal of the nondelegation 
doctrine is to determine whether a grant of rulemaking authority amounts to 
what is akin to a nondelegable “legislative power” vested in Congress, then 
courts by necessity will need to look beyond just a single characteristic. The only 
way to see if the authority granted by a statute is truly on par with a legislative 
power vested in Congress is to consider all of the grant’s characteristics and 
compare them with the same characteristics of a relevant legislative power. 
Courts misconceive legislative power if they overlook some of these 
characteristics when seeking to determine if Congress has impermissibly 
delegated to an executive officer one of its powers granted in Article I. A 
consideration of the full set of defining characteristics is also more faithful to 
the constitutional text and to the Court’s own decisions. Article I does not 
just vest Congress merely with “legislative power.” Rather, it vests in 
Congress those “legislative powers herein granted.” The last two words indicate 
that the enumerated powers granted in Article I are what the Constitution 
says cannot be transferred to others. These are powers that possess multiple 
characteristics—not just an unbounded basis for decisionmaking, the one 
characteristic covered by the intelligible principle test. In fact, the importance 
of other characteristics is necessarily implied by the Constitution’s very 
textual enumeration of specific legislative powers, instead of just vesting 
Congress with catchall “legislative power.” 
A single-minded focus of the intelligible principle test not only creates the 
kind of puzzle highlighted in Part III of this Article, but also misses so much 
of what constitutes a power “granted” to Congress under the Constitution. 
The legislative power granted to Congress to regulate interstate commerce, 
for example, is extremely broad in its range of regulated targets and the scope 
of activities it allows Congress to regulate.81 It also affords Congress the ability 
 
whether it is time-limited versus permanent). Time-limited authority will certainly be more 
constrained than permanent authority, ceteris paribus. Perhaps for this reason, the Supreme Court’s 
plurality opinion in Gundy hints at the possible relevance of temporality in the nondelegation 
context. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129-30 (2019) (noting that “Congress conveyed 
that the Attorney General had only temporary authority”). But this characteristic did not factor into 
the Court’s holding in Gundy and has not been relevant to the analysis of nondelegation questions 
in other decisions of the Court. The National Industrial Recovery Act, after all, was itself emergency 
legislation slated to sunset after two years. National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 
§ 2(c), 48 Stat. 195, 196 (1933). After those two years, any code of fair competition approved by the 
President under the statute would also no longer have enjoyed any legal effect. Yet, despite this clear 
time limitation, the Court still found that the statute unconstitutionally delegated legislative powers. 
This makes sense. After all, if a statute otherwise unconstitutionally authorizes the delegation of 
legislative power, its duration presumably should not matter; two-year violations of the Constitution 
are still constitutional violations. That same conclusion would apply to still shorter durations. 
81 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (noting that, under the Commerce 
Clause, “[t]he power of Congress . . . is broad and sweeping; where it keeps within its sphere and 
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to impose a full panoply of sanctions unconstrained by any special procedures 
beyond those ordinarily required for the passage of legislation. 
A focus on the “intelligible principle” test—understood in terms of the 
basis for exercising discretion—simply misses these other characteristics of 
authority. That test implies that a grant of authority under a decisionmaking 
standard akin to the rational basis test would constitute an impermissible 
delegation. Yet, as noted, the Court has accepted lawmaking grants with 
standards surely as sweeping. That fact implies that there exists more to the 
legislative powers in the Vesting Clause than just the virtually unbounded 
decisionmaking discretion allowed under the rational basis standard. 
Determining the permissibility of a grant of lawmaking authority to an 
executive officer calls for comparing the full set of characteristics of a 
legislative power “herein granted” in the Constitution with the same full set 
of characteristics of the lawmaking authority granted to the executive officer 
in a statute. For a statutory grant of lawmaking power to offend the 
nondelegation doctrine, the lawmaking authorized must be on par with one 
of the powers Congress has been granted under the Constitution. 
VI. DIMENSIONALITY SOLVES THE INTELLIGIBILITY PUZZLE 
Embracing the multiple characteristics of authority helps solve the puzzle 
created by trying to use the intelligible principle test alone to reconcile the 
Supreme Court’s decisions over time. The solution to this puzzle rests with 
the full dimensionality of the granted authority: Is the full “shape” and “size” 
of the authority akin to that of an enumerated legislative power? 
Perhaps an analogy to the way that airlines define permissible carry-on 
luggage will help illustrate. To ensure that luggage will fit into overhead 
compartments, airlines do not merely specify a single dimension of a 
suitcase—say, its width. Instead, they specify the permissible width, height, 
and depth of carry-on luggage. Some airlines even make available at airport 
check-in counters small pre-sized frames built to the permissible dimensions. 
Only if a suitcase can fit inside the frame can it be carried on an airplane. 
In much the same way, the nondelegation doctrine defines the limits on 
any grant of lawmaking authority to executive officers. A permissible grant of 
authority to an agency or the President must fall within the limits set by the 
full dimensions of a legislative power enumerated in the Constitution. It 
 
violates no express constitutional limitation it has been the rule of this Court, going back almost to 
the founding days of the Republic, not to interfere”); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 
567 U.S. 519, 555 (2012) (acknowledging in dicta that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress “enjoys 
vast power to regulate much of what we do”). 
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must, in effect, be sized to fit into a metaphorical overhead compartment, 
capable of being transported from Congress to somewhere else.82 
This approach not only makes conceptual sense for the reasons I have 
offered, but it also reflects the attention the Court has paid in its decisions 
throughout the decades to a range of characteristics of authority, 
notwithstanding its simultaneous invocation of an intelligible principle 
rule. The better label to capture the essence of the nondelegation doctrine 
actually might be a “roving commission” rule83 or even perhaps a “junior-
varsity Congress” rule.84 
In Schechter Poultry, for example, the problem was not merely that the 
National Industrial Recovery Act contained few, if any, meaningful standards 
for the exercise of authority; the problem also lay with the broad extent of 
the lawmaking powers given to the President. The Court stressed that the 
President’s authority under the Act encompassed a “wide field of legislative 
possibilities”85 and “relate[d] to a host of different trades and industries, thus 
extending the President’s discretion to all the varieties of laws which he may 
deem to be beneficial in dealing with the vast array of commercial and 
industrial activities throughout the country.”86 
In his concurring opinion in Schechter Poultry, Justice Cardozo emphasized 
this same breadth of the power authorized by the statute, remarking that the 
Act authorizes the President to become “in effect . . . a roving commission to 
inquire into evils and upon discovery correct them.”87 He emphasized that 
the Act authorized presidential lawmaking authority “as wide as the field of 
 
82 Perhaps some readers would prefer a more abstract way to envision the dimensionality of 
delegation by simply thinking in terms of overall volume in a three-dimensional space. For example, 
one might think of an authorization of lawmaking authority as spanning an inch wide, a foot high, 
and a mile deep, while an equivalent authorization might run a mile wide, a foot high, and an inch 
deep. It is tempting to say that the overall volume is what matters, such that a delegation might only 
be impermissible if it exceeded a specified volumetric threshold—say, if it ran a mile wide and a mile 
high, even if only still an inch deep. Such an alternative framing may help some readers visualize 
statutory grants of lawmaking authority in spatial terms, which would be useful. But I avoid relying 
on a pure volumetric test in the text because what matters is not an abstract number representing 
volume—(width x height x depth)—but instead the specific dimensions associated with an 
enumerated power “herein granted” to the Congress, such as the power to regulate interstate 
commerce. For example, legislation authorizing an administrative agency to regulate both interstate 
and purely intrastate matters (say, a grant of authority that is a mile and a half wide) would be 
impermissible even if the decisionmaking discretion were severely cabined (say, at only an inch high 
and an inch deep). A permissible grant of authority must always fit easily inside the relevant frame, 
not just possess an equivalent volume. 
83 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (Cardozo, 
J., concurring). 
84 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
85 Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 538 (majority opinion). 
86 Id. at 539; cf. id. at 537 (characterizing the authority granted to the President as 
“unfettered discretion”). 
87 Id. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
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industrial regulation,”88 noting that “anything that Congress may do within 
the limits of the [C]ommerce [C]lause for the betterment of business may be 
done by the President upon the recommendation of a trade association by 
calling it a code.”89 It was this full “plenitude of power” that Cardozo reasoned 
could not be transferred to the executive branch.90 
Fast forward to American Trucking. The importance of distinct 
characteristics of governmental authority figured prominently in Justice 
Scalia’s unanimous opinion for the Court, where he matter-of-factly noted 
a relationship between two key features of a statutory grant of authority: 
“It is true enough that the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies 
according to the scope of the power congressionally conferred.”91 He further 
suggested that, “[w]hile Congress need not provide any direction to the 
EPA regarding the manner in which it is to define ‘country elevators,’ 
which are to be exempt from new-stationary-source regulations governing 
grain elevators, . . . it must provide substantial guidance on setting air 
standards that affect the entire national economy.”92 
Justice Scalia recognized that governmental authority can vary in more than 
just the degree of constraint on decisionmaking. Authority can also vary in 
terms of its scope and importance. Now, the Court has not executed anything 
like an algebraic tradeoff of the kind that might be suggested by the language 
in Justice Scalia’s opinion. Indeed, the Court acknowledged that, “even in 
sweeping regulatory schemes,” it has “never demanded . . . that statutes provide 
a ‘determinate criterion’” for decisionmaking.93 Still, the Court’s opinion in 
American Trucking does display judicial recognition of multiple characteristics 
of authority and it supports the appropriateness of taking into account these 
different characteristics for purposes of analyzing a statute’s constitutionality.94 
Toward that end, it is striking to compare how the Clean Air Act and the 
National Industrial Recovery Act stack up in terms of the six characteristics 
 
88 Id. at 553. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (emphasis added). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. (citation omitted). 
94 Justice Elana Kagan’s plurality opinion in Gundy v. United States, the Court’s latest 
nondelegation decision, also emphasized that nondelegation doctrine analysis “requires construing 
the challenged statute to figure out what task it delegates and what instructions it provides.” 139 S. Ct. 
2116, 2123 (2019) (emphasis added). In addition, scholars have sometimes acknowledged these 
different characteristics. See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 1728 & n.17 (distinguishing 
between the possibility of “excessive discretion” and “excessive breadth” to grants of authority). Todd 
Rakoff ’s notion of “omnicompetent” and “omnipowered” agencies is grounded in a similar 
recognition that the nondelegation doctrine is attentive to the scope of power as well as degree of 
discretion. Todd D. Rakoff, The Shape of Law in the American Administrative State, 11 TEL AVIV U. 
STUD. L. 9, 22-24 (1992) (“Omnicompetence, or something near it, cannot, it seems, be delegated.”). 
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presented in the preceding Part of this Article. Both pieces of legislation 
authorized lawmaking by an executive officer, so in terms of the nature of the 
authorized action they were on par with each other. But in terms of every other 
characteristic, the National Industrial Recovery Act swept more expansively. 
 The delegated authority in the New Deal statute had direct legal 
implications for firms across the entire economy and could lead to 
obligations imposed on potentially any business and any aspect of economic 
activity. The Clean Air Act did have economy-wide impacts too—and the 
EPA’s rules under it would affect the air every American would breathe—
but, in the end, the Clean Air Act only concerned the issue of air pollution 
and authorized the imposition of related legal obligations only on polluting 
firms.95 Moreover, the degree of constraint placed on the EPA by the Clean 
Air Act was greater than that imposed on the President by the National 
Industrial Recovery Act, both in terms of a more circumscribed basis for 
decisionmaking and in terms of the environmental statute’s highly specified 
procedures for setting air quality standards, which actually applied on top of 
the normal requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking.96 Finally, 
Schechter Poultry arose from a criminal conviction on an eighteen-count 
indictment, while American Trucking involved a pre-enforcement judicial 
review of ambient air quality standards that, by themselves, did not give rise 
to the possibility of criminal sanctions. 
These are major differences in the statutory grants of authority that 
were at issue in Schechter Poultry and American Trucking. Even if the 
intelligible principle in the Clean Air Act—“requisite to protect the public 
health”97—was far from precise, the other characteristics of the Clean Air 
Act’s authorization were much less extreme than those of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act’s. Taking into account all of these characteristics, 
the New Deal statute gave to the President authority akin to the expansive 
and unconstrained authority Congress has been granted under the 
Commerce Clause. The Clean Air Act clearly did not. 
The other statutes the Court has reviewed since Schechter Poultry also never 
came close to approximating the Commerce Clause power. Admittedly, some 
characteristics in those statutes were expansive, but not all of the characteristics 
were—especially those related to the range of regulated targets and scope of 
regulated activities. The Communications Act of 1934, for example, contained 
 
95 The provision of the Clean Air Act at issue in American Trucking was narrower still. It 
authorized the EPA Administrator to set national ambient air quality standards which did not 
directly affect any private actor. These air quality standards served as a benchmark used only 
indirectly by states and the federal EPA to make other decisions that impose obligations on private 
actors. See id. at 462. 
96 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (2012). 
97 Id. § 7409(b). 
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a broad basis for the exercise of discretion—“public interest, convenience, or 
necessity”—but the regulated targets were limited to radio stations and other 
broadcasting entities.98 Even with respect to just the broadcasting sector, the 
Court noted that the statute “did not give the Commission unfettered 
discretion to regulate all phases of the radio industry.”99 
Similarly, the 1938 Natural Gas Act directed the Federal Power 
Commission to base its decisions on what was “just and reasonable”—far from 
intelligible—but the authority granted to the Commission affected only the 
pricing decisions of natural gas companies.100 The Controlled Substance Act 
of 1970 contained a somewhat broad “imminent hazard to public safety” 
principle, but the statute also imposed procedural steps that the Attorney 
General needed to follow and the scope of authority was limited to regulating 
drug users and their possession of illegal substances.101 Put simply, no other 
statute has yet to come to the Court with anything like the breadth of the 
granted authority, across all of its characteristics, exhibited in the National 
Industrial Recovery Act.102 
Without question, many statutes have given executive officers substantial 
authority over significant policy issues. But the existence of substantial 
authority is not the test that fits with the Court’s application of the 
nondelegation doctrine. Rather, the test which best accounts for the Court’s 
nondelegation decisions incorporates the totality of the characteristics of a 
grant of authority to see if that grant approximates an enumerated legislative 
power in the way that the National Industrial Recovery Act’s delegation did.103 
 
98 See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943). 
99 Id. at 219. 
100 See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 595, 609-10 (1944) (noting 
that the Federal Power Commission was established for the purpose of “regulating the wholesale 
distribution to public service companies of natural gas moving interstate” and that it “was given no 
authority over ‘the production or gathering of natural gas’”). 
101 Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 162-167 (1991) (noting that the statute limited the 
Attorney General to making scheduling decisions about controlled substances). 
102 Cf. HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 3 , at 137 (“[Schechter Poultry] involved the most 
sweeping congressional delegation of all time.”). Perhaps tellingly, in its most recent nondelegation 
case, Gundy v. United States, the Court’s plurality opinion made a point of observing that the statute 
in that case, when “compared to the delegations we have upheld in the past, is distinctly small-bore.” 
139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019).  
103 The emphasis on totality—that is, on the ceding to another branch of government a whole 
constitutionally granted legislative power—is consistent with the Framers’ understanding that the 
roles of different branches of government could overlap to some extent. Separation of powers “did 
not mean that these departments [i.e., branches of government] ought to have no partial agency in, 
or no control over, the acts of each other. . . . [But] where the whole power of one department is 
exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental 
principles of a free constitution are subverted.” THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302-03 (James 
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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How exactly each of these characteristics should be “measured,” and then 
combined, is surely not as clear-cut as the requirements for carry-on luggage 
aboard airplanes. But conceptually the approach is the same. The idea is to 
look at the “shape” and “size” of the authority granted by a statute to an 
executive officer to see whether it matches the “shape” and “size” of a 
legislative power granted to Congress in the Constitution. 
If it were possible to visualize authority in more than three dimensions, 
each of the six characteristics elaborated in Part V could be conceived of as a 
separate dimension that defines that authority’s shape and size. Even though 
it is not humanly possible to visualize six dimensions, it is possible still to 
illustrate authority graphically. To do so, the authority’s six characteristics first 
need to be grouped into three main categories, as indicated in Part V, based 
on whether they address (a) the nature of the authorized action, (b) its scope 
or impact (that is, the extent of the power authorized), or (c) the basis for 
exercising the authority (that is, the degree of discretion in exercising power). 
The first grouping—the nature of the action—operates simply as a 
condition precedent. It is a binary threshold that constitutes a necessary 
condition for the applicability of the nondelegation doctrine. The nature of 
the authorized action will either be “legislative” in the colloquial sense of 
lawmaking, or it will not be. The nondelegation doctrine will only be 
implicated if the statute authorizes lawmaking. When Congress does authorize 
lawmaking, the analysis then focuses on the remaining two groupings of 
characteristics: “Extent of Power” (which captures the range of regulatory 
targets, actions, and sanctions), and “Degree of Discretion” (which focuses on 
the statute’s intelligible principle and required decisionmaking procedures). 
To illustrate, the multiple characteristics that fall in these two groupings 
can be combined and arrayed along two dimensions as indicated in Figure 1 
on the next page, with one axis for the extent of power and the other for degree 
of discretion. For each dimension, the axis ends at the point that represents 
the extent of  power or degree of discretion, respectively, that Congress 
possesses under the relevant legislative power granted in Article I. The shaded 
area in Figure 1 represents the domain for permissible statutory grants of 
authority.104 I have offered some arguable placements for three statutes within 
 
 
 
104 The shape of the curve in Figure 1 and the precise point at which it starts to turn are 
heuristically established. They reflect the inherent imprecision any court will face in locating a grant 
in spatial terms and thus a degree of precaution a court will likely exercise when any grant of 
authority comes close to the extremes on both axes. Nothing essential turns on Figure 1’s 
nonlinearity nor in the precise asymptotic relationship of each axis to the curve. The point is simply 
that, as the extent of power coupled with the degree of discretion reach a point approximating that 
of a legislative power granted in Article I, then it cannot be lawfully transferred. 
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this two-dimensional space, simply for the sake of illustration. Regardless of 
where exactly the Communications Act of 1934 and the Clean Air Act should 
be situated within the shaded part of Figure 1,105 it is clear that the National 
Industrial Recovery Act falls within the very upper right portion of the 
diagram, where both the degree of discretion and the extent of power are 
extremely high. 
Figure 1’s representation of the dimensions of authority fits with the Court’s 
treatment of statutes under the nondelegation doctrine. It shows that there 
exists substantial room for Congress to authorize lawmaking by executive 
officers—even with only the thinnest constraint on discretion in terms of the 
intelligibility of the statute’s basis for decisionmaking.106 But where a statute 
grants an executive officer power coterminous with an Article I legislative 
105 These placements largely reflect just the permitted substantive basis for decisionmaking 
(i.e., the intelligible principle). Taking into account the rulemaking procedures imposed on agencies 
like the Federal Communications Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency would 
justify situating their underlying statutes still farther to the left on the horizontal axis in Figure 1 in 
terms of the degree of discretion. 
106 Although the space for permissible authorization of lawmaking by executive officers may 
be relatively large, Congress’s power does still have limits. This contrasts with what Posner and 
Vermeule have characterized as the “naïve view” of the nondelegation doctrine, which they say treats 
any authorization as permissible and would only prohibit “Congress or its individual members 
[from] attempt[ing] to cede to anyone else the members’ de jure powers as federal legislative officers, 
such as the power to vote on proposed statutes.” Posner & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 1726. For a 
discussion of an existing statute that would almost certainly fail the dimensionality test but would 
presumably pass muster under the naïve view, see infra notes 137–145 and accompanying text. 
Figure 1: Illustrative Spatial Mapping of the Nondelegation Doctrine 
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power, such as the regulation of interstate commerce, and where the exercise of 
that power also lacks any meaningful constraint, then the authority granted by 
the statute impermissibly falls in the upper right corner of Figure 1 and can be 
said to have taken a shape and size that is equivalent to a legislative power. 
Given how much shaded space exists in Figure 1, Congress has 
considerable room to authorize rulemaking by executive officers—which is 
undoubtedly why the nondelegation doctrine has seemed to fall out of usage. 
Congress usually passes legislation focused on particular problems, which 
means that rulemaking authorizations will often be naturally circumscribed 
and thus will rarely reach the upper-right portion of Figure 1.107 
VII. ADVANTAGES OF DIMENSIONALITY 
Although the basic dynamics of the political process may keep Congress 
from venturing close to the space which would make legislation 
unconstitutional, the nondelegation doctrine remains alive. A dimensional 
understanding of nondelegation not only accommodates the continued 
existence of the doctrine, but it also holds at least three advantages from the 
standpoint of constitutional doctrine over an understanding based solely on 
the intelligible principle: it does a better job of making the Court’s past 
decisions coherent; it provides a more manageable and disciplined basis for 
judicial decisionmaking; and it offers insights relevant to the application of 
so-called nondelegation canons. 
Doctrinal Coherence. From an internal perspective, the first advantage of a 
dimensional account of nondelegation is that it fits better with the Court’s 
actual decisions than declaring the doctrine dead or claiming that the Court 
has failed to enforce the doctrine. For the reasons presented in Part VI, the 
dimensional account avoids the incoherence that arises from an exclusive 
emphasis on the intelligible principle test, and it does so while still showing 
that the doctrine remains alive, as the Court continues to acknowledge. The 
Court’s decision in Schechter Poultry makes sense given the degree to which the 
National Industrial Recovery Act’s provisions approximated, in terms of all of 
the Act’s characteristics, the kind of authority given to Congress under the 
Interstate Commerce Clause. No subsequent case to come before the Court 
has been even close along both dimensions of authority illustrated in Figure 1. 
This is not to deny that one of the Court’s opinions might not be easily 
reconciled with the dimensional account. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,108 
decided about five months before Schechter Poultry, might well be seen as 
 
107 For a discussion of how specific problems motivate the policy agenda in Washington, D.C., 
see generally JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (2d ed. 2010). 
108 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
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running in tension with the dimensional approach. That case arose under 
section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, which gave the 
President authority to prohibit interstate oil sales to reinforce state quotas. 
The range of targets—i.e., oil companies—and scope of actions—i.e., the 
transportation of oil—were circumscribed. Even though the effects of energy 
regulation can carry through most parts of the economy, section 9(c) was 
certainly no grant of legislative power in its full dimensions. It clearly did not 
authorize the President to regulate virtually all sectors of the economy. 
Despite that lack of a sweeping extent of power, the majority in Panama 
Refining held that section 9(c) offended the nondelegation doctrine. Yet it never 
clearly explained why, nor did it distinguish section 9(c) from other statutory 
authorizations that the Court had upheld in prior cases. The weak reasoning in 
the majority opinion in Panama Refining might by itself justify discounting the 
decision. In one part, for instance, the opinion appears to be squarely grounded 
in due process considerations rather than the nondelegation doctrine.109 
Although the Panama Refining majority seemed to focus on two 
characteristics of the authorization given to the President—the lack of a need 
for a principled basis for decisionmaking, and the limited extent of required 
process—the Justices were certainly not unaware of the overall sweeping 
authority Congress had granted the President elsewhere in the statute. To 
the extent the Justices in Panama Refining were in fact reacting to the 
National Industrial Recovery Act’s overall breadth, that would itself be 
consistent with the dimensional account, even if the section strictly before 
the Court was more limited. 
Still, if in the end Panama Refining cannot be reconciled with the 
dimensional understanding of the nondelegation doctrine, I am prepared to 
accept that it is because the decision, rather than the dimensional 
understanding, is what is wrong. After all, that seems to have been Justice 
Cardozo’s position. The reasoning he provided in his Panama Refining dissent 
is tellingly consistent with the dimensional understanding of the 
nondelegation doctrine. Cardozo made much of the limited extent of the 
power granted to the President under section 9(c), reasoning that “[t]here has 
been no grant to the Executive of any roving commission to inquire into evils 
and then, upon discovering them, do anything he pleases.”110 Cardozo was 
attentive to both the degree of discretion and the extent of power—the latter 
which was narrower than a legislative power granted to Congress. 
 
109 See id. at 432 (“To repeat, we are concerned with the delegation of legislative power. If the 
citizen is to be punished for the crime of violating a legislative order of an executive officer . . . due 
process of law requires that . . . the order is within the authority of the officer . . . .”). 
110 Id. at 435 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
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Notwithstanding Panama Refining, the dimensional understanding fares 
better overall, as a positive matter, compared with the alternatives of either 
declaring the nondelegation doctrine dead (which effectively rejects both 
Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry) or “rejuvenating” the doctrine (which 
effectively charges that the Court has incorrectly decided at least several of 
its nondelegation cases since Schechter Poultry). It is for this reason that the 
first virtue of the dimensional account rests with its ability to provide a more 
coherent account of the Supreme Court’s application of the nondelegation 
doctrine than the alternatives. 
Judicial Manageability. A second advantage of the dimensional account is that 
it makes applying the doctrine easier and more disciplined. The intelligible 
principle test’s lack of intelligibility has meant that it offers judges no 
meaningful guidance. In fact, “[t]he modern Court has repeatedly expressed 
concern about the lack of manageable standards for enforcing the nondelegation 
doctrine.”111 But a dimensional understanding of the doctrine does better. 
Admittedly, this advantage may be difficult to see at first. A dimensional 
approach might even initially seem to be more complex, if for no reason other 
than because it contains more variables than the single-variable intelligible 
principle test. If judges already struggle with a one-variable test, how, it might 
be asked, are judges to sort out and weigh multiple variables to make practical 
decisions? Will not more variables leave more room for discretion by 
unelected judges? 
The dimensionality test is not one of balancing the multiple characteristics 
or weighing them against one another. It does not call for combining these 
characteristics so as to make an exceedingly difficult judgment about whether 
a piece of legislation grants an executive officer in the abstract “too much” 
authority, or is “too broad” or “too open-ended.” Judgment calls like these, 
completely untethered from anything but perhaps the judge’s own gut 
instincts, would indeed prove unworkable if not also unwise. That is exactly 
what makes reliance solely on the intelligible principle test neither intelligible 
nor principled. 
But a multidimensional test asks straightforwardly whether the entirety of a 
grant of authority, in both its extent of power and degree of discretion, tends to 
match the entirety of a legislative power that Article I vests in Congress. How 
close, in other words, is the grant of authority in size and shape to the power to 
regulate interstate commerce? Rather than leaving judicial decisionmaking 
completely untethered, the dimensional test grounds the judicial inquiry in a 
concrete comparison with a legislative power “herein granted.” 
 
111 Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1508 (2015). 
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Focusing on the multiple dimensions of a statutory grant of authority 
provides courts with a conceptual vocabulary and checklist for distinguishing 
between lawful grants of rulemaking authority and unconstitutional transfers 
of legislative power. The test for a court is to run through each point on the 
checklist and ask, for each of the characteristics of a grant of authority, 
whether it approximates that same characteristic as reflected in one of 
Congress’s enumerated powers. If the multiple characteristics match, the 
grant of authority is unconstitutional. 
Undoubtedly, there can still arise differing judgments about determining 
exactly how broad or narrow, unbounded or constrained, any single 
characteristic might be. Beyond that reality, though, the dimensional 
understanding, with its benchmark in the Constitution’s enumerations, 
actually leaves less room overall for judicial discretion—because at least 
judges have some benchmark for their decisionmaking. In addition, with a 
dimensional test defined by a set of characteristics, presumably in most cases 
there will be a greater likelihood of agreement across judges in terms of how 
they characterize some, if not most, of the relevant characteristics. As long as 
it is clear that some characteristics of a legislative grant do not match the 
corresponding characteristic of an enumerated power, then the grant of 
authority will be constitutional. 
Clarifying Canons. Although the nondelegation doctrine has seldom 
provided a basis for the Supreme Court to invalidate legislation, it has more 
frequently influenced judicial interpretation of statutes, especially in light of 
the canon of constitutional avoidance.112 The dimensional understanding of 
the nondelegation doctrine offers a third advantage by way of clarifying the 
role of this canon and suggesting additional options for courts when 
interpreting statutes in response to nondelegation concerns. 
In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 
for example, the Court appears to have construed, for constitutional 
avoidance purposes, the underlying statute to require that the agency make a 
finding of “significant risk”.113 But a dimensional understanding would have 
suggested little need to invoke constitutional avoidance in that case. The 
Court’s constitutional question should have answered itself easily, just in the 
asking: Is an occupational safety and health statute even plausibly 
 
112 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989) (“In recent years, our 
application of the nondelegation doctrine principally has been limited to the interpretation of 
statutory texts, and, more particularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that 
might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional.”); Lisa Shultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at 
the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1409 (2000) 
(“The Court has used clear-statement rules and the canon of avoidance as surrogates for the 
nondelegation doctrine.”); Sunstein, supra note 3. 
113 448 U.S. 607, 607 (1980). 
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unconstitutional if it does not demand “that the risk from a toxic substance 
[is] quantified . . . as significant in an understandable way”?114 Surely the 
answer should be “no,” because the statute only governed workplace health 
and safety risks. It did not give the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) sweeping authority to regulate all types of actions 
across the entire market economy—a power akin to one that is enumerated in 
Article I. OSHA quite clearly could not have used its authority to regulate 
securities fraud, radio spectrum licensing, railroad shipping rates, electricity 
transmission, or any number of other entities and activities that Congress 
could regulate under a legislative power granted under Article I. 
But when the avoidance canon does indeed become relevant—and it 
would whenever a grant of authority starts to look like it falls close to the 
upper-right corner of Figure 1—attentiveness to dimensionality makes clear 
that a court possesses multiple levers to avoid constitutional concern. It could 
construe the statute in such a way that, as the Court did in Industrial Union, 
narrows the basis for the administrator’s judgment—such as by requiring an 
administrator to make a finding of “significant risk.”115 But it could also 
instead construe the statute to authorize lawmaking over a narrower 
regulatory range or to a smaller subset of firms or business activities. In other 
words, tightening up on any of the characteristics of the authority granted 
will serve to shrink its overall size if a court seeks to avoid any question about 
whether the rulemaking authority, in its full dimensions, approximates a 
power that Congress possesses under Article I. 
VIII. THE FUTURE OF THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE 
The dimensional understanding of the nondelegation doctrine presented 
here draws on the past, reconciling the Court’s continued recognition of the 
viability of the nondelegation doctrine with the fact that the Court has not 
used it in over eighty years to invalidate legislation. Yet what, if anything, 
might the dimensional understanding have to say for the doctrine’s future? 
Several members of the current Court have recognized the incoherence of 
the intelligible principle test and have suggested using the doctrine to invalidate 
legislation. Situating the nondelegation doctrine in spatial terms can help to 
clarify the doctrine and contribute to debate over whether it should be invoked 
more frequently to strike down legislation. In particular, judges and lawyers 
seeking a way of making the nondelegation doctrine meaningful should consider 
 
114 Id. at 646. 
115 Id. For further background on the Court’s approach in Industrial Union, see generally Cary 
Coglianese & Gabriel Scheffler, Private Standards and the Benzene Case: A Teaching Guide, 71 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 353 (2019). 
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the advantages that the dimensional understanding offers in terms of improving 
doctrinal coherence and judicial manageability. 
At least four Justices have endorsed the view that the Court has erred in 
not using the doctrine more vigorously to check grants of rulemaking 
authority. Justice Clarence Thomas, for example, has argued that the Court’s 
prevailing approach in nondelegation doctrine cases “abdicates” responsibility 
for “adequately reinforc[ing] the Constitution’s allocation of legislative 
power.”116 Justice Neil Gorsuch, in a dissenting opinion in Gundy v. United 
States that was joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice John Roberts, 
condemned “the intelligible principle misadventure” for having led the Court 
to “accelerate the flight of power from the legislative to the executive 
branch.”117 Justice Samuel Alito has also expressed his support for revisiting 
the Court’s approach to the nondelegation doctrine at a suitable time.118 
These Justices have correctly recognized the inability of the intelligible 
principle test to provide a coherent standard for judges to draw a line between 
permissible and impermissible grants of lawmaking authority to executive 
officers. Yet so far they have not been able to propose a standard that will likely 
prove any more manageable in practice. In his Gundy dissent, for example, 
Justice Gorsuch suggested that the intelligible principle test ought to be replaced 
by three alternative “guiding principles,”119 any one of which would justify the 
authorization of rulemaking by an executive. First, he indicated that as long as 
legislation establishes the “controlling general policy,”120 with “standards 
sufficiently definite and precise,”121 then executive officers may rely on “residual” 
rulemaking authority to “fill up the details.”122 Second, he said that Congress 
can make the legal effect of statutory provisions contingent on “fact-finding” by 
an executive officer.123 Finally, he argued that Congress may lawfully “confer[] 
wide discretion to the executive” to engage in rulemaking when the subject 
matter “overlaps” with the executive’s own constitutional authority.124 
 
116  Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1246 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
117 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141-42 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
118 Id. at 2130-31 (Alito, J., concurring). 
119 Id. at 2135-36 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Gorsuch asserts that these principles were 
supplied by “the framers.” Id. 
120 Id. at 2136. Justice Thomas has also argued that Congress may not allow an executive officer 
to exercise too much “policy judgment” when making rules. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. at 1251 
(Thomas, J. concurring) (“[O]ur mistake lies in assuming that any degree of policy judgment is 
permissible when it comes to establishing generally applicable rules governing private conduct.”). 
121 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 2137. On these grounds, for example, Justice Gorsuch surmises that Congress may be 
permitted to give the President the authority to make trade rules, because “many foreign affairs 
powers are constitutionally vested in the president under Article II.” Id. 
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Unfortunately, it is hard to see how these three principles can provide 
guidance any more meaningful than the intelligible principle test. Each of them 
would still leave judges with considerable uncertainty over their proper 
application.125 Moreover, if any single one of them suffices to justify rulemaking 
authority, together they can never be more coherent than the least coherent of 
the three. This is undoubtedly why Kristin E. Hickman has observed, in 
commenting on Justice Gorsuch’s suggested alternative framework, that 
“finding a better and more rigorous standard for discerning between acceptable 
from unacceptable grants of rulemaking authority is very, very hard.”126 The 
idea of “contrasting ‘mere “details”’ with rules governing final conduct,” she has 
explained, “seems too susceptible to the whim of the moment.”127 
The Court’s proponents of a reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine seem 
to favor replacing an intelligible principle test with one that hinges on having 
“policy” decisions made by Congress.128 Yet as John Manning has noted, “[a]ll 
legislation necessarily leaves some measure of policy-making discretion to 
those who implement it.”129 For the same reason that the intelligible principle 
test fails on its own, judges will surely find themselves unable to make a 
principled determination of how much policy judgment in executive hands is 
too much. A unidimensional focus on the degree of policy discretion will run 
into the same problems as has a unidimensional focus on the degree of 
 
125 Probably most observers will see Gorsuch’s first principle as the least coherent or 
constraining, but the extent to which the other two principles provide judges with meaningful 
guidance should also not be overstated. The third principle appears question-begging because any 
time a statute directs an executive officer to implement a statute through rulemaking, then carrying 
out that statute would constitute one of the officer’s “non-legislative responsibilities”—namely 
execution—that Justice Gorsuch admits that Congress may give to executive officers. Id. The second 
principle might appear to be the most constraining, but the “factual findings” called for by the 
statutes in the cases that Justice Gorsuch approvingly cites came along with normative or policy 
judgments: “neutral commerce,” and “obstruct, impair, or injuriously modify the navigation of [a] 
river.” Id. at 2136-37, 2141 (citing Cargo of Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388 
(1813), and Miller v. Mayor of N.Y., 109 U.S. 385, 393 (1883)). How much normative or policy 
judgment can a statute allow before factfinding would cease to be deemed sufficiently dependent on 
the finding of facts? That question may well afford no clearer nor more constraining answer than 
one asking about the intelligibility of a principle. Cf. Cary Coglianese & Gary Marchant, Shifting 
Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1274-82 (2004) 
(discussing implicit normativity in supposedly scientific decisionmaking). 
126 Kristin E. Hickman, Gundy, Nondelegation, and Never-Ending Hope, THE REG. REVIEW 
(July 8, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/07/08/hickman-nondelegation/ [https://perma.cc/
9KCC-RSZE]. 
127 Id.  
128 Justice Gorsuch writes in his dissent that “as long as Congress makes the policy decisions 
when regulating private conduct, it may authorize another branch to ‘fill up the details.’” Gundy, 139 
S. Ct. at 2136. Similarly, Justice Thomas has indicated that “policy determinations” in the hands of 
an executive officer “pose a constitutional problem.” Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 
1225, 1248 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
129 Manning, supra note 21, at 241. 
 
1884 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1849 
intelligibility. Indeed, perhaps for this reason the Court has “almost never felt 
qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy 
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.”130 
In his concurring opinion in Department of Transportation v. Association of 
American Railroads, Justice Thomas has forthrightly acknowledged these 
difficulties and admitted that the Court’s “reluctance to second-guess 
Congress on the degree of policy judgment is understandable.”131 But he has 
nonetheless asserted that the Court’s “mistake lies in assuming that any 
degree of policy judgment is permissible.”132 Justice Thomas’s assertion points 
to what may well be the most fashionable doctrinal argument that others have 
put forward for more robust judicial oversight of legislation under the 
nondelegation doctrine: an argument from the extreme.133 Surely it would be 
unconstitutional, the argument goes, for Congress to go to the extreme of 
passing a law that, without anything more, authorizes the Secretary of 
Commerce to “regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”134 Given that such a hypothetical 
piece of legislation would be clearly unconstitutional, then naturally, the 
argument continues, the nondelegation doctrine cannot be dead and other 
delegations of substantial authority must also be unconstitutional. 
The dimensional account offers a clear response to this kind of argument: 
yes, any statute that did nothing more than track the exact language of an 
Article I enumerated power (a legislative power “herein granted”) would 
indeed be unconstitutional. The dimensional account also does more; it shows 
that any other statutory grant of lawmaking with full dimensions close to 
those of an enumerated legislative power would also be unconstitutional, no 
matter how such a grant were worded. 
But this response does not necessarily support the conclusion of those 
who, arguing from the extreme, claim that the Court has let the 
nondelegation doctrine die and that it should be reinvigorated. On the 
contrary, it is simply to acknowledge that the prototypical extreme scenario 
 
130 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001) (quoting Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
131 Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. at 1251. 
132 Id. (emphasis in original). 
133 See, e.g., Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash, Delegation Really Running Riot, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 1035, 1038 (2007) (addressing “mind-blowing” scenarios of congressional delegations of 
enumerated authority to consent to treaties and judicial appointments, impeach officers, or propose 
constitutional amendments); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 
339-340 (2002) (offering hypotheticals of a statute written in “gibberish” and of one “forbidding ‘all 
transactions in interstate commerce that fail to promote goodness and niceness’”); see also Posner & 
Vermeule, supra note 12, at 1741 (describing extreme claims as among the “most popular” arguments 
for a vigorous nondelegation doctrine). 
134 This language directly replicates that of the Commerce Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
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is precisely where the nondelegation doctrine lives. What constitutes an 
impermissible delegation under current law is indeed any lawmaking 
authorization that reaches the extremes on both of the key dimensions: the 
extent of power, and the degree of discretion. 
Acknowledging that the nondelegation doctrine may only make 
impermissible a statutory grant of authority that resides in a remote corner of 
the law does not necessarily mean that the nondelegation doctrine is trivial or 
irrelevant today. Congress may actually have gone too far on the extremes of 
both of the key dimensions of authority with at least one piece of existing 
legislation that has yet to be reviewed by the Court on nondelegation grounds: 
the Magnuson–Moss Act. Arguably this statute might figure into the 
nondelegation doctrine’s future as a law that the Court does eventually 
invalidate. Yet even if a case challenging it never reaches the Court, a brief 
review of the characteristics of the Magnuson–Moss Act can at least help 
illustrate the application of the dimensionality test and show how that test can, 
in principle, still constrain Congress, even if most other pieces of legislation 
would continue to avoid invalidation under the nondelegation doctrine. 
The Magnuson–Moss Act gives the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
authority to issue binding rules defining “acts or practices which are unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”135 On its face, this 
statutory provision bears a striking resemblance to the National Industrial 
Recovery Act’s unconstitutional authorization of the President to adopt 
“codes of fair competition.”136 The extent of power that its terms grant to 
the FTC is sweeping. Like the President under the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, the FTC under the Magnuson–Moss Act can issue rules 
related to any and all sectors of the economy—anything “affecting 
commerce”—and addressing any type of business activity.137 These FTC 
rules are backed up with the possibility of both civil and criminal 
penalties.138 In short, as one commentator has noted, the statute appears to 
have made the FTC the “lawmaking body with the broadest legislative 
powers ever delegated to a federal agency since Schechter Poultry.”139 
 
135 Magnuson–Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 
93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975), 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2012). 
136 Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 521-523. Indeed, it has been argued that the statute “ushers in 
a new era of N.R.A.-type industry.” Katherine Gibbs Sch. (Inc.) v. FTC, 612 F.2d 658, 670, 683 (2d 
Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., dissenting) (noting the petitioner’s unsuccessful nondelegation argument). 
137 “Commerce” is defined in a manner comparable to Congress’s interstate commerce power: 
“commerce among the several States.” 15 U.S.C. § 44 (2012); see also id. § 45 (authorizing the FTC to 
address unfair business practices “in or affecting commerce”). 
138 Id. §§ 56(b), 57b(a). 
139 Edward W. Lane, Jr., Schechter and the FTC: A Roving Commission, 39 BUS. LAW. 153, 159 
(1983); see also id. at 154 (noting that “the Commission is invited to study any and all acts and practices 
in or affecting interstate commerce, and to make rules about those with are unfair or deceptive”). 
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In terms of the degree of discretion, neither the Magnuson–Moss Act nor 
the underlying Federal Trade Commission Act which it amends includes a 
definition of what constitutes “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”140 The 
statute provides no intelligible principle, that is, no explicit basis to guide the 
agency in deciding whether to define a particular business practice as unfair 
or deceptive. An American Bar Association committee noted some time ago 
that the term “unfairness” in the Magnuson–Moss Act “is not a meaningful 
standard for decision making . . . [and] because it is so vague, there can be 
virtually no effective judicial or legislative review of Commission activity.”141 
The main difference between the FTC’s rulemaking and Congress’s 
interstate commerce power would appear to reside with their respective 
procedural constraints. The Magnuson–Moss Act makes clear that the FTC 
must follow the Administrative Procedure Act and it goes further to require 
the Commission to provide for an “informal hearing,” including “appropriate” 
cross-examination on “disputed issues of material fact.”142 It also requires the 
FTC to issue with its final rule a statement that, among other things, explains 
why the regulated acts or practices are unfair or deceptive.143 
Although the Schechter Poultry Court noted the absence of normal 
administrative procedures in the National Industrial Recovery Act, it is far 
from clear that the existence of normal administrative procedures—and even 
a few that go beyond normal—would be enough to save the Magnuson–Moss 
Act. The Act is already on its face well out on the extremes in terms of its 
extent of power and degree of discretion. The Act’s procedures probably 
cannot greatly pull back the degree of discretion from these outer limits. 
Moreover, the dimensionality test calls for comparing rulemaking procedures 
with the procedures for the passing of legislation, the latter of which are 
certainly not trivial. As a result, although the absence of any procedures will 
certainly compound an otherwise extreme degree of discretion, the existence 
of some required procedures is probably not enough to salvage a grant of 
rulemaking authority that otherwise looks quite like a legislative power 
“herein granted” to Congress by Article I. 
This analysis of the Magnuson–Moss Act shows that a dimensional 
understanding need not deprive the nondelegation doctrine of all its vitality. Of 
 
140 The FTC’s general authority over unfair or deceptive acts or practices can be found at 
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
141 Federal Trade Commission Rulemaking: A Report of Committee on Consumer Financial Services, 
37 BUS. LAW. 925, 940 (1982). 
142  15 U.S.C. § 57a(c)(2)(B) (2012). 
143 Specifically, the statute requires statements explaining “the prevalence of the acts or 
practices treated by the rule,” “the manner and context in which such acts or practices are unfair or 
deceptive,” and “the economic effect of the rule, taking into account the effect on small business and 
consumers.” Id. § 57a(d)(1). 
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course, any time a statute is deemed invalid under a multidimensional test of the 
kind outlined here, it will also presumably be invalid under a unidimensional 
test as well. In other words, if a statute such as the Magnuson–Moss Act lies at 
the outer extreme of both the power and discretion axes, then it presumably also 
should fail under an approach, such as the intelligible principle test, that looks 
merely at one of these axes. But the problem with a unidimensional focus is that 
it does not explain why the Magnuson–Moss Act should be deemed invalid 
when other statutes viewed through a similar unidimensional lens have been 
held to be valid. Only a multidimensional understanding of the doctrine 
provides judges with a coherent doctrinal basis for determining when to 
invalidate laws like the Magnuson–Moss Act on nondelegation challenges—and 
when to accept other laws. 
Consider in this regard the controversy that arose over President Donald 
Trump’s declaration of a national emergency in connection with asylum 
seekers at the southern border of the United States.144 The Military 
Construction Codification Act, one of the statutes cited by President Trump 
in his emergency declaration, authorizes the Secretary of Defense in a time 
of declared national emergency to act “without regard to any other provision 
of law” and to pursue military construction initiatives “not otherwise 
authorized by law that are necessary to support such use of the armed 
forces.”145 If the Supreme Court should eventually confront the 
constitutionality of this statute on nondelegation grounds, the approach 
consistent with precedent will be to ask whether the statute’s grant of 
authority approximates the dimensionality of an Article I legislative power. 
The fact that the President has claimed an emergency should not alter the 
constitutional analysis. As the Court explained in Schechter Poultry, 
“[e]xtraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power.”146 
Thus, when it comes to assessing the constitutionality of any statute 
authorizing presidential action during an emergency, the issue will remain 
the dimensional one: Is the President’s statutory power close in its 
dimensions to a legislative power granted to Congress? If so, the statute will 
be unconstitutional regardless of the emergency conditions. After all, the 
emergency nature of the National Industrial Recovery Act, with its expressly 
limited duration, did not prevent the Court from concluding that the Act 
amounted to an unconstitutional transfer of legislative power.147 
 
144 See Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United States, 
Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019). 
145 10 U.S.C. § 2808(a) (2012). 
146 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528 (1935). 
147 See supra note 80. 
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To see how dimensionality matters in analyzing Congress’s grant of 
authority to the Secretary of Defense under the Military Construction 
Codification Act, consider that when viewed through the lens of the 
intelligible principle test that statute would almost surely fail. Neither that 
Act nor the separate National Emergencies Act,148 a procedural statute 
concerning how presidents should declare emergencies, ever define what 
constitutes an “emergency.” Neither provides any decisionmaking criterion to 
determine when an emergency should be declared and hence to establish a 
basis for the Secretary’s exercise of discretion. 
But the failure of a statute to provide a meaningful constraint on the basis 
for executive decisions, it should be clear by now, does not exhaust the analysis. 
A dimensional test demands that the Court ask about the extent of power too. 
Does the Military Construction Codification Act give either the President or 
the Defense Secretary one of Congress’s powers, such as taxing and spending? 
It does not. The extent of power authorized under the Military Construction 
Codification Act is far from sweeping. According to the Act, construction 
projects authorized in a time of emergency “may be undertaken only within 
the total amount of funds that have been appropriated for military 
construction . . . that have not been obligated.”149 This is a far cry from the 
virtually unlimited legislative power that Congress possesses to appropriate 
funds. Although other aspects of the Trump Administration’s efforts to use 
national emergency authority to build additional physical barriers along the 
U.S. southern border may prove unlawful for other reasons, Congress’s action 
in the first place in authorizing the Secretary of Defense to reallocate 
construction funding in a time of emergency would not be among them. 
In the end, taking the dimensionality of authority into account can 
helpfully clarify legal analysis of existing laws; ignoring dimensionality will 
only continue to foster puzzlement and incoherence. Single dimensional tests 
present judges with merely an abstract task of discerning how much authority 
is “too much,” while a full dimensionality approach tethers judicial inquiry to 
the powers stipulated in the text of the Constitution, directing judges to 
compare the fullness of contested rulemaking authority to the fullness of one 
of the legislative powers enumerated in Article I. The text of the Constitution 
does not unqualifiedly prohibit Congress from authorizing the executive 
branch to exercise any lawmaking power; however, by vesting enumerated 
powers in Congress, the Constitution does preclude the full transfer of those 
“legislative powers herein granted.” 
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CONCLUSION 
The nondelegation doctrine has appeared to hold a puzzling status in 
contemporary constitutional and administrative law, with commentators 
treating it variously as moribund or a failure. Yet the Supreme Court treats 
the doctrine as alive and continues to ground it in the Vesting Clause of 
Article I. It does so even though the Court also continues to uphold 
rulemaking authority guided by statutory principles that are far from 
intelligible. Abandoning the nondelegation doctrine altogether would mean 
repudiating what the Supreme Court itself has never repudiated; however, 
reinvigorating the nondelegation doctrine would run contrary to many of the 
Court’s decisions over decades. 
The approach most faithful to the Court’s record of decisions rejects the 
intelligible principle test as the defining essence of the nondelegation doctrine. 
Instead, it takes the full dimensionality of authority into account. When the 
relevant authority involves lawmaking, the judicial question becomes whether 
that authority equates with one of the powers “herein granted” to Congress in 
Article I, such as the power to regulate interstate commerce. 
The required judicial analysis comprises a multi-dimensional survey of 
both the extent of the power granted to the executive officer as well as the 
degree of discretion afforded to that same officer. Then the court compares 
the results of that survey with a similar multi-dimensional survey of the 
relevant enumerated power in Article I. Only when the results of the two 
surveys tend to match on all fronts does the statutory grant fall.  
Properly understood, the nondelegation doctrine does not call for an 
untethered judicial inquiry into whether a statute contains a sufficiently 
“intelligible” principle—nor whether, in the abstract, it gives an executive 
officer “too much” discretion. Rather, the test is grounded in an actual Article 
I power used as a benchmark. In this way, taking account of the dimensions 
of delegation fits better with the history and current status of the 
nondelegation doctrine than do calls for either rejecting or reinvigorating the 
doctrine—and doing so is more firmly rooted in the full text of Article I’s 
Vesting Clause. Recognition of the dimensions of delegation also promises a 
more coherent and judicially manageable framework for courts to use in 
analyzing constitutional limits on Congress’s ability to empower an 
administrative state. 
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